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SUMMARY OF OIL AND GAS




HIS article provides an overview of 2006 developments in the oil
and gas sector in South America.
A. ARGENTINA
In Argentina, the government continues to fight high demand for oil
products and shortages in the local market, prompted by robust economic
growth of approximately 8 percent and governmental restrictions on the
export of these products. The government has also responded to declin-
ing production with the adoption of Law 26154, which grants certain tax
incentives to exploration and production companies who sign association
agreements with the national oil company ENARSA.
B. BRAZIL
In 2006, Brazil re-elected Workers' Party candidate Luiz Indcio da
Silva (Lula) to a second term, bringing certainty to the power sector
where Lula's policies will be continued. With respect to gas, Petrobras is
reviewing the development plans of the gas-rich Santos Basin in light of
the nationalization of the Bolivian gas sector (some Brazilians criticized
Lula for not more vigorously challenging the nationalization of Brazilian
commercial interests in Bolivia). Petrobras, in addition to the other for-
eign investors, ultimately reached new accords with Bolivia, contemplat-
ing significantly higher tax rates and less advantageous terms and
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conditions. Brazil is also considering a new gas law to bring greater cer-
tainty to the sector and encourage further development.
C. BOLIVIA
In May 2006, the government of President Evo Morales issued a de-
cree, finalizing the nationalization of the oil and gas sector. Bolivia's de-
cision reflects the third time it has opened the sector to private
investment, only to subsequently nationalize it, symbolizing the powerful
forces of petro-nationalism in the region.' In November 2006, applying
the above-mentioned decree, the government, through the state-owned
company YPFB, signed new operational agreements with the private oil
and gas producers. In addition, Bolivia signed a new twenty-year agree-
ment to supply gas to Argentina.
D. PERU
In 2006, Peruvians elected Alan Garcia as its next president, replacing
President Alejandro Toledo. Garcia has supported the U.S.-Peru Free
Trade Agreement, which is pending ratification before the U.S. Congress.
Garcia had previously served as president in an era of high inflation and
market intervention policies, but he vowed to learn from his mistakes and
narrowly defeated a left-of-center candidate supported by Hugo Chavez.
E. COLOMBIA
Colombia, in contrast to the general trend in the region, carried out the
privatization of its largest gas company, Ecogas. In addition, President
Alvaro Uribe has proposed privatizing 10 percent of Ecopetrol, the coun-
try's national oil company.2 In May 2006, President Alvaro Uribe was re-
elected for the 2006-2010 term, receiving over 60 percent of the vote (in
2005, the Congress approved the constitutional amendment to permit re-
election). In November 2006, Colombia and the United States signed a
free trade agreement, which is pending ratification.
II. ARGENTINE GAS MARKET
A. POST ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CRISIS -
THE EMERGENCY LAW OF 2001
As mentioned above, in December 2001, Argentina passed the Emer-
gency Law, 3 revoking its currency board/convertibility policy and offi-
cially ending Argentina's experiment with neo-liberal economic policies.
1. See Oil's Dark Secret - National Oil Companies, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 2006.
2. The country decided to sell 20 percent of the capital of Ecopetrol to third parties.
See Ecopetrol, www.ecopetrol.com.co/contenido (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). The
Colombian Congress had approved Draft Law No. 013 converting Ecopetrol into a
mixed company and authorizing the sale of 20 percent of its shares. See also Viva
la Ciudadania, www.vivalaciudadania.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
3. Law No. 25561, July 1, 2002, B.O.
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Argentina's economic crisis, felt in all sectors of the economy, affected
the successful oil and gas industry in a particularly severe way. The de-
valuation of the Argentine peso and subsequent measures to control the
price of gas resulted in an abrupt and significant reduction in new invest-
ment in the gas sector and an increased demand for gas in the domestic
market. Due to the implementation of the electronic gas market (see
discussion below), gas exports are now more limited, and the situation
has been aggravated due to the fact that the artificially low price of gas
drove many Argentine industries to convert from fuel oil to gas.
B. THE SECOND GENERATION REFORMS
In February 2004, the Argentine government passed a series of amend-
ments to this legal framework, issuing Executive Decree Numbers 180/04
and 181/04, in an attempt to solve the critical situation described above
and to encourage gas producers to make new investments in the upstream
gas sector. The so-called second generation reforms introduced impor-
tant changes to the legal framework, such as abandoning the principle of
uniform prices for all gas customers, resulting in a market price distinc-
tion between consumers and large industrial concerns for these two mar-
ket segments.
In March 2004, the government issued additional regulations, including
the energy secretariat's Resolution Number 265, which authorized the na-
tional authorities to ration natural gas exports in order to ensure domes-
tic supply. 4 The measure damaged relations with Chile, as Argentine gas
suppliers were not permitted to supply gas to Chilean power companies,
causing disruptions in the Chilean economy. In May 2004, the Argentine
government also levied a 20 percent withholding tax on gas exports,
which was later increased to 45 percent.5 This tax was also applied to
other fuels, such as butane and other gas products. In May 2005, the
Energy Secretariat issued Resolution Number 752, which supplemented
Decrees Number 180/04 and Number 181/04 and modified but did not
eliminate price controls on gas. In fact, Resolution Number 752 estab-
lished a mechanism for bypassing distributors by which certain categories
of large consumers (i.e. those averaging a monthly consumption of more
than 9,000 cubic meters) could purchase natural gas at the injection point
of the transportation system directly from the producers. As of January
2006, large industries have been purchasing natural gas from producers
with prices in U.S. dollars, and most of the major producers are develop-
ing oil and gas exploration activities, which are positive signs for the sec-
tor. A great deal of the expansion has taken place during 2006 and is
expected to continue during 2007 and 2008 with an expected investment
4. With low hydrocarbon reserves of its own, Chile became the largest purchaser of
Argentine natural gas in the late 1990s, depending on Argentine natural gas for 40
percent of its electricity. As a consequence of the implementation of measures to
mitigate the impact on the domestic gas market, some observers are expecting
arbitration claims to be filed against the Argentine government.
5. The increase was adopted after the gas supply agreement with Bolivia was signed.
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of approximately of U.S. $1.1 billion. The allocation of the expansion for
such infrastructure is taking place by open public bids and has been fi-
nanced through tariffs, loans, and contributions by direct beneficiaries.
C. ELECTRONIC GAS MARKET (EGM)
As part of the Second Generation Reforms, Decree Number 180/04
created the Electronic Gas Market (EGM), by which all spot gas supply
and its respective transportation capacity are marketed. The EGM was
subsequently launched in September 2005. Via a standardized irrevoca-
ble offer mechanism, direct customers that do not have gas supply agree-
ments with producers may directly purchase natural gas on a term basis
on the EGM. Under the EGM, customers purchase gas by filing a stan-
dardized irrevocable offer to purchase the requested quantity of natural
gas. If ten days elapse without acceptance of the offer, then the Energy
Secretariat is required to assign the offer to a producer.
D. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY CLAIMS
As a result of the Pesification reforms, several foreign investors (includ-
ing several gas companies) filed claims against Argentina with the Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under
their respective bilateral investment treaties (BIT).6 In general, the peti-
tioning foreign investors argued that the substantial reduction of tariffs
(on an inflation adjusted basis) after Pesification violated their concession
agreements, impeded their ability to pay off U.S. dollar denominated
debts incurred in reliance on their concession contracts, and resulted in
significant economic losses. As of December 2006, approximately forty
claims had been filed with ICSID against Argentina, making it the gov-
ernment with the most complaints of this nature filed against it.7
A large number of claims remain unresolved. Some companies have
received large awards, which still remain unsatisfied. Other companies
have settled their cases in order to pursue new or existing opportunities
in the Argentine market. For example, in June 2005, CMS Gas Transmis-
sion Company (CMS), a minority shareholder in the gas transmission
company Transportadora de Gas del Norte, obtained an award against
the Argentine government for approximately U.S. $130 million. Re-
cently, Argentina altered its position towards the ICSID arbitration tribu-
nal by acknowledging the award obtained by CMS and electing not to
challenge it in the local courts. Camuzzi International, 8 which had sought
damages of approximately U.S. $250 million, announced its decision in
6. Argentina has bilateral investment treaties with several of its major trading part-
ners, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain.
7. The list of complainants includes AES, Enron, Vivendi, Anglian Water, Enersis,
and El Paso, among others. See Matthew Est6vez, Paying the Piper, LATIN TRADE,
Dec. 2006, at 22-23.
8. Camuzzi International holds Camuzzi Gas Pampeana and Camuzzi Gas del Sur,
two important gas distributors.
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December 2005 to abandon the case in an attempt to improve its relation-
ship with the government. The Italian group has several other important
investments in Argentina. 9
E. RETURN OF AN ARGENTINE NOC-ENARSA
Since 1995, Argentina has seen significant consolidation in the oil and
gas market with foreign energy companies purchasing their smaller Ar-
gentine counterparts. Such consolidation included: (1) the BP-Amoco-
Bridas transaction forming Pan American Energy, (2) the acquisition of
YPF by Repsol of Spain (which substantially reduced the total liquidity of
the Buenos Aires stock exchange), and (3) the acquisition by Petrobras of
Brazil of a majority stake in Argentina's remaining large independent oil
company, Pecom Energfa. Perhaps in response to this growing foreign
control of the oil and gas sector, in late 2004, the government formed a
new state-owned national oil and gas company, Energfa Argentina Socie-
dad An6nima (ENARSA), with the goal of the state playing a greater
role in the sector and stimulating exploration and production activities in
off-shore basins, particularly by possibly associating with other national
oil companies from the region.
Although many Argentine energy observers expected ENARSA to
sign off-shore exploration contracts with PDVSA, ENARSA has sur-
prised some observers by executing several agreements with Repsol YPF,
Petrobras, and Petrouruguay' ° to explore and exploit offshore blocks.
The project has an exploration budget of approximately U.S. $40 million,
and the marine seismic stages have already commenced. In addition,
ENARSA is already involved in several on-shore exploration, wind en-
ergy, and gas transportation projects.
Notwithstanding the implementation of the EGM, exporting Argentine
gas continued to be difficult, as the government imposed measures to
force the sale of gas to the domestic market." In fact, the increase in the
price of gas in 2006 actually permitted gas producers to commence a new
round of investments. The development of new gas fields (such as Karina
and Aries), off-shore blocks being developed in the southern part of the
9. Its investments in Argentina include Empresa Distribuidora de Energfa Atlintica
(EDEA), a concessionaire serving the Province of Buenos Aires, Empresa de
Energia de Rfo Negro Sociedad An6nima (EDERSA), an energy distributor in
the Rfo Negro Province, and Empresa de Transporte de Energfa El6ctrica por Dis-
tribuci6n Troncal de la Patagonia Sociedad An6nima (TRANSPA), a unique trans-
port company of the Patagonian System.
10. Petrouruguay is an affiliate of the state-owned Uruguayan ANCAP.
11. In October 2006, Argentina's Energy Secretariat issued a decree tightening con-
trols on the export of diesel fuel, gasoline, fuel oil, and other petroleum products
in an effort to assure its domestic supply. Under the new rules, companies must
register for authorization with the Department of Fuels before exporting these
products, and the department will authorize the export if the supply of the product
is deemed sufficient to meet domestic demand. Domestic controls have kept the
price of gasoline and other products at approximately 40-50 percent below foreign
market prices since 2003. See Charles Newbery, Argentina Tightens Hold on Oil
Products Exports, PLArS OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 3, 2006, at 7.
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country by a consortium led by Total, Wintershall, and Panamerican En-
ergy, and other on-shore fields (such as Makueta, a gas field operated by
Panamerican Energy in the northern part of the country) cannot yet sat-
isfy the increasingly large demand from the industrial domestic market.
In 2006, in response to the tight domestic gas market, Argentina and
Bolivia executed a long-term supply agreement that contemplates Bolivia
selling gas to Argentina at two and a half times the local gas price in
Argentina. 12 In addition, in October 2006, the two countries signed an
energy integration agreement that contemplates the construction of a
new northeast gas pipeline-Gasoducto del Noroeste-to be commenced
in June 2007. The Gasoducto del Noroeste will allow for transportation
of the Bolivian natural gas contemplated under the long-term supply
agreement.
13
F. PROMOTING EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES
In an additional attempt to expand the horizons of oil and gas reserves,
in November 2006, the Argentine Congress passed a law creating the pro-
motional system for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. 14 This
law creates a series of tax benefits for interested companies, such as: (1)
the advance refund of value added tax (VAT) levied on investments in
capital goods and infrastructure projects, (2) the accelerated depreciation
of income tax, (3) the exemption of property used in such activities from
the tax basis of the minimum presumed income tax, and (4) the exemp-
tion from payment of import duties and any other charges for the import
of capital goods, spare parts, or components of said goods that are not
manufactured in Argentina but are used to carry out exploration and ex-
ploitation activities. To obtain these benefits, oil and gas companies must
enter into association agreements with ENARSA, giving this once virtual
national oil company more influence. Although the rules governing the
association agreement are still pending, the new norm could prove attrac-
tive to small and medium energy companies. As evidence of the in-
creased activity in the exploration and production area, seismic services
and rig equipment were not readily available until June 2007. Moreover,
provincial governments are calling for new international bidding
processes on new exploration fields during 2007, and it is believed that
12. By 2010 and at a beginning price of U.S. $5 per million BTUs, Argentina will
acquire 27.7 cubic meters per day. The term of the agreement is twenty years.
13. The Gasoducto del Noreste will require an investment of approximately U.S. $1.4
billion and will be operated by ENARSA. This pipeline will link Yacuiba, a Boliv-
ian city, to guaranty a supply of several provinces in Argentina, such as Salta, For-
mosa, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Santa Fe.
14. Law Number 26154, adopted as of November 9, 2006, will govern all national ex-
ploration licenses awarded under Hydrocarbon Law Number 17319 or by the prov-
inces, provided such licenses explicitly adhere to this system. Law No. 26154, Nov.
11, 2006, B.O.
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the new tax incentives regime may attract interested companies. 15
III. BRAZILIAN NATURAL GAS MARKET
A. INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of natural gas in Brazil and its importance in the na-
tional energy matrix have historically been a secondary concern. But
given the global trend of increased demand for gas and fearful of the
consequences of over-dependence on hydroelectric energy, the Brazilian
government has recently begun to place more importance on natural gas.
To this effect, recent surveys show that natural gas represents 8.8 percent
of the national energy matrix, 16 and the government's stated goal is to
increase it gradually so that it may become more commensurate with in-
ternational levels. Furthermore, the discovery of new natural gas
reserves in Brazil, the rapid rise of crude oil prices in the international
market (and the related search for substitutes), and the recent nationali-
zation of gas reserves and changes in the political situation in neighboring
Bolivia (and its impact on Brazil's plans to expand the Brazil-Bolivia
pipeline) have prompted Brazil to support policies encouraging the do-
mestic exploitation and consumption of natural gas. 17
B. ANP's 7TH AND 8TH ROUND OF BIDS
Given these developments, natural gas played an enhanced and argua-
bly unprecedented role in the National Petroleum Agency's (ANP) sev-
enth round of bids for the exploitation of oilfields and natural gas
reserves held in October 2005 and the eighth round held in November
2006.18
C. CURRENT SITUATION - PROPOSED GAS LAW
The gas industry's major concerns derive from the fact that even
though the upstream activities (exploration and production) for both oil
and natural gas are very similar, the midstream activities (i.e. refining,
processing, transportation, and storage) and downstream activities (i.e.
distribution and reselling) of natural gas are substantially different from
those of the oil industry, and hence require market specific legal norms.
In response to such concerns and in aiming to create a more legally-se-
15. Nine provinces announced bids for new exploration and production rounds in
2006: Mendoza, Salta, La Pampa, Santa Cruz, San Juan, Chubut, Neuquen, La
Rioja, and Rio Negro.
16. See MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY BALANCE SHEET OF
2005 (BALAN(O ENERGI8TICO NACIONAL) (2006).
17. Bolivia is the primary importer of natural gas for Brazil.
18. Per article 23 of Law Number 9478/97, the ANP grants concessions via a public
bidding process for the exploration and production of natural gas. In contrast, per
article 8(v) of the Oil and Gas Law, activities such as transportation and process-
ing, as well as the importation and exportation of natural gas, only require an
authorization from the ANP, a significantly less cumbersome process. Lei No.
9.478, de 6 de agosto de 1997, D.O. (Brazil).
528 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
cure environment for national and foreign investors in natural gas in Bra-
zil, the Ministry of Mines and Energy has announced its intention to
propose a new and comprehensive gas sector law. Based on the initial
announcements, this proposed law would regulate all areas of the gas
chain (i.e. production, transportation, and marketing). Although the en-
actment of a more detailed regulatory framework for the gas sector is
necessary in order to stimulate private investment in this sector, the states
may oppose on jurisdictional grounds the enactment of the aforemen-
tioned proposals on the basis that article 25(2) of the Federal Constitu-
tion provides that the states have the sole jurisdiction to organize and
provide gas distribution services.
D. NEW PROJECTS
As noted above, due to the Bolivian crisis, the Brazilian government
was forced to review its policies and plans for the natural gas sector. The
main change was the government's decision to be less dependent on Bo-
livian gas, to invest in the exploration of national reserves, and to suspend
the expansion plans for the Brazil-Bolivia pipeline. The external situa-
tion has also prompted Brazil to put on hold a project regarding the feasi-
bility of the construction of a South American natural gas pipeline to
integrate the South American countries' pipeline networks. Finally, an-
other consequence may be that Brazilian government will redirect its ef-
forts toward other domestic projects, such as the construction of the
Amazon Forest Pipeline (linking the Urucu basin to Manaus). This facil-
ity will support the construction of a large thermal power plant to supply
all the power needs for the city of Manaus.
IV. BOLIVIAN GAS SECTOR
A. INTRODUCTION
In July 2004, Bolivia held a binding referendum in which a majority
approved the nationalization of the oil and gas sector. Subsequently, the
new Law of Hydrocarbons Number 3058 of May 17, 2005 was passed.
Although this law sets the foundation for the nationalization of hydrocar-
bons, on May 1, 2006, the government under President Evo Morales is-
sued the Nationalization Supreme Decree Number 28701, through which
the State effectively took control of the entire commercial and produc-
tion chain of the oil and gas sector. In November 2006, applying the
above-mentioned decree, the government, through the state-owned com-
pany YPFB, signed new operational agreements with all private oil and
gas producers currently operating in Bolivia.1 9
19. Bolivia announced that it was withdrawing from the Washington based Interna-
tional Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). See Latin Leftists
Mull Quitting World Bank Arbitrator, REUTERS, April 30, 2007.
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B. BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION
The Bolivian Constitution provides that all hydrocarbons, including
natural gas, located in Bolivian territory are the original property of the
Bolivian State. The rights to explore and exploit such resources must be
granted by the Bolivian State. YPFB acts on behalf of the Bolivian State,
the Ministry of Hydrocarbons represents the government, and the Super-
intendency of Hydrocarbons serves as the regulatory authority for the
distribution of oil and gas. The Bolivian Constitution also requires that
Congress approve all agreements involving the production or marketing
of natural resources. The forty-four operational agreements recently
signed between YPFB and private producers are currently being re-
viewed by Congress. Given the favorable terms recently renegotiated,
the Congress is expected to approve the agreements. 20
C. HYDROCARBONS LAW
Although the Hydrocarbons Law Number 3058 of May 17, 2005 has
been duly enacted and is in effect, some of the corresponding regulations
are still being drafted. The main aspects of this law are as follows:
(i) Article 5 (paragraph one) provides the basic new mandate that
all hydrocarbons recovered at the wellhead are for the benefit of
the Bolivian State. Article 5 (paragraph two) of the Hydrocar-
bons Law provides that parties to joint venture agreements en-
tered into with YPFB under the former Law of Hydrocarbons
Number 1689 must convert their agreements into new forms of
agreements within 180 days of enactment of the new law. As
mentioned above, as of this date, all private producers have en-
tered into new operational agreements with YPFB.
(ii) Article 16 of the Hydrocarbons Law reaffirms the claim of the
Bolivian State to original ownership of the hydrocarbons by pro-
viding that "hydrocarbon deposits in whatever state or form they
may lie, are of the direct, perpetual, and inalienable domain of
the State." No contract may confer ownership of the hydrocar-
bon deposits, over hydrocarbons at the wellhead, or over hydro-
carbons at the point of measurement. Furthermore, under article
16, any party to a shared production agreement, operational
agreement, or association agreement must deliver to the State all
of the hydrocarbons produced within the established contractual
term.
(iii) Articles 53 through 57 of the Hydrocarbons Law create and regu-
late the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (DTH) applicable to the
production of hydrocarbons at wellhead, measured at the point
of measurement. The obligation to pay the DTH is generated at
20. The Bolivian Congress has approved new upstream contracts signed with ten for-
eign oil companies. See 2007 Economist Intelligence Unit, Bolivia: Oil Contracts
Advance, April 9, 2007.
530 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
the point of measurement, and the taxpayer shall be any individ-
ual or entity that has produced the hydrocarbons that are being
measured.
(iv) The DTH rate is 32 percent of the total production of hydrocar-
bons measured at the point of measurement. The DTH applies in
a non-progressive and direct manner, allowing no deductions or
credit offsets. The DTH applies equally to the existing 18 per-
cent royalty rate. Hence, both measures in effect create a com-
bined royalty rate of 50 percent.
(v) According to the Hydrocarbons Law, the export of gas to world-
wide spot markets is not subject to any special restrictions. As
long as the gas export commitments are duly complied with, pro-
ducers are free to sell (or not) their gas to any willing national or
international buyer.
D. NATIONALIZATION SUPREME DECREE
NUMBER 28701 OF MAY 1, 2006
The Nationalization Supreme Decree Number 28701 of May 1, 2006
provides that YPFB must market all of the oil and natural gas by defining
prices, volumes, and conditions for sale and also places this entity in con-
trol of the entire production chain.
The decree created a new tax/royalty or participation for YPFB by
which private producers operating in the major fields of San Antonio and
San Alberto would have to relinquish an additional 32 percent of produc-
tion at the wellhead. Only three private producers (Petrobras Bolivia,
Andina S.A., and Total Bolivia) would have been directly affected by this
measure that would have increased participation by the national oil com-
pany YPFB from 50 percent to 82 percent. But presently, the additional
32 percent tax has been eliminated, and all producers are contributing 50
percent of production to the State.
Although the rest of the private producers that operate in fields pro-
ducing less that 100 million cubic feet per day will continue to contribute
50 percent of production and not 82 percent as described above, the de-
cree permits an increase in the tax rate if a subsequent audit proves that
the company has surpassed 100 million cubic feet per day. This norm also
imposes a mandatory sale of shares, so that YPFB will control 51 percent
of the companies Andina S.A. (Repsol YPF), Chaco S.A. (BP), Trans-
redes S.A. (Shell), Petrobras Bolivia Refinaci6n S.A., and C.L.H.B. S.A.
E. NEW TAX AND ROYALTY STRUCTURE
As a result of the above-mentioned Hydrocarbons Law and Nationali-
zation Supreme Decree, the Bolivian tax structure for hydrocarbons has
changed dramatically. The taxes are now as follows: royalties (18 per-
cent), DTH (32 percent), income tax (25 percent), and withholding tax
(12.5 percent).
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F. OPERATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Supreme Decree Number 28701 of May 1, 2006 was the first step of the
so-called nationalization process through which Bolivia exerts control
over all the commercial and production chain in an attempt to industrial-
ize its hydrocarbon resources in the near future. According to this de-
cree, private oil and gas producers had a 180-day term to enter into new
forms of agreements with YPFB. This term expired on October 28, 2006,
but on November 1, 2006, the government executed forty-four operating
contracts with all of the private oil and gas companies currently operating
in Bolivia. In 2006, no company filed an arbitration claim or suspended
its operations.
The following summary describes the most important clauses of the op-
erational agreements, which are now being reviewed by Congress:
(i) Private producers who have executed to the operational agree-
ments (producers) must cover all costs, personnel, technology, fa-
cilities, materials, and capital necessary for the execution of oil
operations. YPFB shall not assume any responsibility regarding
operations or their results. Producers shall be entitled to com-
pensation from YPFB in exchange for their activities
(compensation).
(ii) Title to the hydrocarbons in whatever form they may exist will in
no way be conferred to the producers and will remain throughout
the property of YPFB.
(iii) The term of the contract is thirty years, as of the effective date,
but shall come into effect after its approval by Congress.
(iv) Once the producer has made a commercial discovery, it must
submit a development plan to YPFB for approval. The producer
must commence upstream activities according to the develop-
ment plan within 180 days of its approval.
(v) The volume and amount of net hydrocarbons must be measured
and determined constantly at the monitoring points. YPFB must
also verify all volumes and quality of the net hydrocarbons at the
monitoring point for further certification to the Ministry of Hy-
drocarbons. Such measurements shall be the basis for the pay-
ment of (1) departmental royalties, (2) national compensatory
royalties, (3) participation for the Treasury, and (4) the direct tax
on hydrocarbons.
(vi) Compensation to the producer shall consist of (1) sums for the
reimbursement of costs and expenses and (2) direct profit, both
as previously approved by YPFB. Compensation shall be paid in
U.S. dollars. If a conflict between the parties arises with regards
to the amount of compensation, then the parties shall first try to
resolve the dispute through mediation; and if this fails, then the
parties may invoke binding arbitration.
(vii) The producer is required to conduct the operations on a continu-
ous basis and in conformity with applicable laws, prudent indus-
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try practices, development plans, work programs, and budgets
approved by YPFB, and other terms and conditions. YPFB must
provide all necessary data that the holder does not possess.
(viii) When hiring its own personnel or subcontractors, the producer
must give preference to qualified Bolivian citizens with experi-
ence in the required position. Foreign personnel may not surpass
15 percent of the company payroll. The producer must include
national personnel at all hierarchical levels, whether technical or
managerial. Subcontractors must be chosen via public tenders.
(ix) In order to cover risks related to the performance of the opera-
tions, the producer must obtain and maintain in full force and
effect all insurance policies required in conformity with prudent
industry practices. These policies must cover loss or damage to
goods, materials, equipment, and facilities; personal and third-
party damage; contamination risks, oil well blow-out, and others.
(x) Within twenty days of approval by Congress of the agreements,
producers must present a compliance guarantee to YPFB. YPFB
shall have the right to terminate the agreement if the producer
does not obtain the bank guarantees contemplated in the con-
tract within five days of the commencement of each phase of the
initial exploration period. YPFB may also terminate the contract
if the holder refuses to produce the necessary volumes for sup-
plying the internal market.
(xi) The agreement shall be subject to Bolivian law. The agreement
must be executed and interpreted in Spanish. Any translation
shall be made solely for convenience purposes and shall not be
considered for purposes of interpretation.
(xii) Conflicts arising between the producer and YPFB must first be
brought before the control and monitoring unit. If the disagree-
ment is not resolved before this body, then the matter shall be
submitted to the executives of the involved parties, who shall
have a maximum term of ninety days to reach an agreement. If
no agreement is reached, then the parties may resort to an arbi-
tration process to be held in the city of La Paz, Bolivia, in accor-
dance with ICC rules. An arbitration panel of three arbitrators
shall be chosen, and the proceeding shall be conducted in
Spanish.
(xiii) The parties renounce invoking any type of diplomatic interven-
tion for dispute resolution.
G. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR 2007 AS A RESULT
OF NATIONALIZATION
Prior to the nationalization of the oil and gas sector, the Bolivian State
received approximately U.S. $250 million per year in the form of taxes
and royalties from the oil and gas sector. With the passage of the new law
and with the issuance of the nationalization decree, some observers are
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estimating that Bolivia could receive U.S. $1.3 billion per year in taxes
and royalties. 21
With these new funds, Bolivia hopes to continue to develop its hydro-
carbons infrastructure. Projects such as gas to liquids,22 liquid natural gas
(LNG),23 petrochemicals, 24 and new investments for exploration and pro-
duction for new markets are expected to require large investments of up
to collectively U.S. $4 billion per year. In addition, rising gas prices and
new gas supply agreements with neighboring countries, such as the con-
tract recently signed with Argentina to export up to 27 million cubic feet
of gas per day until 2025, may increase this annual investment figure. 25
V. CHILEAN GAS SECTOR
A. INTRODUCTION
Chile imports approximately 70 percent of its primary energy in the
form of oil and gas and coal. This strong dependence, coupled with in-
creasing fuel supply difficulties encountered in today's market, has made
Chile particularly vulnerable to the volatility of international fuel prices
and to supply interruptions and shortages. 26 In 1995, Chile and Argen-
tina signed a bilateral protocol whereby Argentina committed to supply
natural gas to Chile and not to impose restrictions or other negative mea-
sures, including specific tax burdens on Argentine producers who ex-
ported gas to Chile. In 1997, the first Argentine-Chile gas pipeline
started operations, and since then natural gas has become a fast-growing
source of energy, allowing Chile to add an alternative fuel source for
power generation in the country, diversify its energy sources which until
then depended mostly on hydro electrical power, obtain a much cheaper
and more secure electricity supply, and provide cleaner air in its larger
21. LA RAZON, Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.larazon.es. Of course, some ana-
lysts may question whether the decision to re-nationalize the industry will really
benefit the country in the long-run, given the possible loss of investor confidence.
22. Foreign companies have expressed an interest in deploying gas-to-liquid technolo-
gies to produce synthetic diesel fuel. Proposals range from a 10,000 barrel per day
(bpd) plant to serve domestic demand to 50,000-100,000 bpd plants for export.
Bolivian gas is well-suited to GTL applications due to its extremely low sulfur
content. See U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(2006).
23. A number of companies have investigated the possibility of exporting LNG via a
Pacific port to southern California and/or Mexico. But the U.S. $5 billion project
was stopped due to social concerns about an export route through Bolivia's histori-
cal rival Chile. As of December 2004, the Bolivian government has been pursuing
the development of gas export projects through Peru, although higher transporta-
tion costs and political instability pose important obstacles. Id.
24. Petrobras has been studying the possibility of a U.S. $1.4 billion petrochemicals
plant in Bolivia. If built, the plant would have the capacity to produce 100,000 tons
of polyethylene for the Bolivian market and 500,000 tons for export to Brazil. Id.
25. Investment for the pipeline may reach U.S. $1.9 billion. See Acuerdo con Bolivia
por el gas, LA GACETA TUCUMAN, March 27, 2007, available at http://www.
lagaceta.com/vernotae.asp?id-nota=199582.
26. See Chile's Energy Security Policy, Chile's National Energy Commission, http://
www.cne.cl (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter CNE].
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cities, especially Santiago. To this effect, approximately U.S. $4 billion
was invested in gas pipelines in the northern, central, and southern re-
gions of the country, gas distribution networks, and gas-fired power
plants.
But in the last three years, Chile has been caught in the throes of Ar-
gentina's energy crisis, which started in 2002, at the time of the country's
economic and financial collapse, and which adversely impacted the Ar-
gentine oil and gas industry. Hit by such energy shortage, Argentina
started to impose restrictions and to curtail gas exports to Chile in April
2004 and, moreover, levied a 20 percent withholding tax on gas exports,
which was increased in July 2006 to 45 percent.2 7 Effectively, in July
2006, Argentina more than doubled its tax on natural gas exports to
neighboring countries, increasing Chile's cost for fuel by as much as 92
percent. As a result, in 2006, Chile's natural gas bill increased U.S. $130
million. Pursuant to its agreement reached with Bolivia, Argentina was
charged U.S. $5 for every million British Thermal Unit (BTU), which
made a significant difference with its domestic market value of U.S. $1.50
per million BTU. As a result, Chile was hit with a 45 percent tax rate,
compared to the 20 percent tax rate it had been paying since May 2004.
Price distortions in Argentina have discouraged investment in explora-
tion and production, while at subsidized prices demand has rocketed both
for home consumption and electricity generation, leaving the system
overstretched with limited volumes to honor export contracts. Argentina
has been importing gas from Bolivia since 2004 to help meet local de-
mand and fulfill part of its export commitments with Chile. Even with
the agreement reached with Bolivia, Argentina still had to continue re-
ducing the volume of gas that Argentina exports to Chile. The average
gas supply to Chile in 2004 was 18.4 million cubic meters per day. In year
2005, exports were reduced to 16.7 million cubic meters, and in year 2006,
to 15.6 million cubic meters-this last figure representing less than one-
half of the 34 million cubic meters per day agreed to in the protocol be-
tween the two countries. Depending on the purchase price that each Ar-
gentina natural gas generator or distributor agreed upon, the new price of
gas for Chile will range between U.S. $4 to U.S. $5 for every million BTU
plus the cost of transport (U.S. $1 to U.S. $2 per million BTU), which
means that the cost of importing natural gas in Chile is approximately
U.S. $6 per million BTU.28
Chile's government has recognized that the restrictions on the supply
of gas from Argentina are likely to persist. This is due in part to Argen-
tina's soaring domestic consumption demand, aggravated by the conver-
sion of many Argentine industries from fuel oil to gas in recent years, a
lack of investments in the sector experienced for some years, a lack of
27. See Bachelet Recibi6 Respuesta de Kirchner, ARCHIVO DE PRENSA GOBIERNO DE
MENDoZA, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.earchivo.mendoza.gov.ar/todo.php?idnota=
2786.
28. Bloomberg, DIARIo FINANCIERO AND MERCOPRESS, July 24, 2006.
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sufficient production capacity for supplying its domestic demand, its vul-
nerability to weather conditions, and the expanded pessimism about the
prospects of finding more gas reserves in Argentina's three main basins,
particularly Neuqudn, which supplies central and southern Chile. Fur-
thermore, planned increases in the capacity of the pipelines that connect
Argentina's gas basins to Buenos Aires will also probably lead to less gas
available for export.2 9
This situation has caused a severe disruption in the Chilean economy,
as Argentina is its sole supplier of natural gas. Many industries in Chile
that had switched to natural gas, attracted by its lower cost and the need
to comply with stricter clean air requirements, have been forced to switch
back, wherever possible, to more expensive fuels, such as fuel oil.30
In dealing with the bilateral protocol with Argentina and the gas supply
difficulties and shortages faced in recent years with its neighboring coun-
try, Chile's government has adopted a conciliatory approach, designed to
ensure a minimum supply from Argentina, securing at the very least
Chile's home consumption, while power generators and industries switch
to or incorporate alternative fuels. Chile's government has pursued the
maintenance of good political relations with President Kirchner's govern-
ment, resisting the pressures of imposing compensatory safeguard tariffs
on Argentina's imports and, more importantly, refusing to take the case
to the World Trade Organization or another international forum. Any
such actions, as President Kirchner pointed out in a visit to the Chilean
Senate in 2005, would cause Argentina to immediately suspend all its gas
supplies to Chile until the dispute becomes resolved, which would take
years. 3 1
Confirming the difficult energy scenario that Chile faces, Mining and
Energy Secretary of State Poniachik issued a statement in early January
2007, whereby she warned that the prospects of Argentina's gas supplies
for year 2007 look quite poor due to the above factors, with experts esti-
mating that gas shortages will increase and that Argentina's supplies will
not reach 14 million cubic meters per day.32
B. CHILEAN GENERATORS BRING ARBITRATION CASES
AGAINST CLIENTS AND GAS SUPPLIERS
Power generators Colbiln, ENDESA, AES Genor, and Electroandina,
among others, have brought arbitration cases against some of their indus-
trial clients and Argentine gas suppliers. On an international level, these
measures seek for the Argentine producers to compensate the Chilean
generators for damages resulting from gas restrictions. On a local level,
the objective is to make clear the higher costs of energy production due




32. EL MERCURIO, Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.emol.com.
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to the gas supply restrictions from Argentina. AES Genor has estimated
its actual contractual damages at approximately U.S. $7.3 million,
whereas ENDESA estimated its actual damages to be U.S. $31.4 million
and future damages to be U.S. $322 million.33
C. CHILE'S ENERGY SECURITY POLICY
In November 2006, Chile's energy security policy prepared by Chile's
Energy Commission acknowledged that "energy security has emerged as
one of the main challenges facing virtually all countries which, like Chile,
depend on imports of different fuels to produce the energy they require
for transport, electricity generation, industrial uses, home heating and all
the other needs of a growing and developing economy. ' 34 It further
states that "today, the issue of 'energy security' is part of the political,
diplomatic, economic and commercial agenda of most countries around
the world. In fact, it was the main topic addressed by leaders of the G8
nations at their St. Petersburg summit in July (2006) when they signed a
Plan of Action for Global Energy Security that includes measures to in-
crease the transparency, predictability and stability of global energy mar-
kets, improve the investment climate in the energy sector, enhance
energy efficiency and saving, diversify energy mix; ensure the physical
security of energy infrastructure, and address issues relating to sus-
tainability and climate change. '35
The Chilean government has prepared an ambitious, but realistic, en-
ergy security policy under which it is implementing short and medium-
term measures that seek to 1) diversify the country's energy matrix (in
terms of both fuels and suppliers); 2) achieve greater energy autonomy;
and 3) encourage the efficient and intelligent use of energy.
The government has stated that it is aware that Chile faces an impor-
tant challenge and that is why it is actively promoting investment in con-
ventional and non-conventional energy sources, taking into special
consideration hydrological and environmental variables, as well as logisti-
cal and technical challenges that need be addressed to guarantee the sys-
tem's security, particularly in the Northern Interconnected System
(SING), which serves the north of the country. The new regulatory
framework for Chile's electricity sector (First Fast-Track Law of 2004 and
the Second Fast-Track Law of 2005), was designed precisely to provide
adequate incentives for private investment in new electricity projects.
The first law regulated transmission and was aimed at creating incentives
in this segment of the industry, while the second law provided regulatory
and economic incentives for new investment in power generation capac-
ity, including conventional projects (hydroelectric and thermoelectric)
and alternative renewable energy (ARE) sources. In order to minimize
its dependence on particular fuels and suppliers, there is no doubt that
33. DIARIo FINANCIERO, Nov. 2, 2006, available at http://www.diariofinanciero.cl.
34. CNE, supra note 25.
35. Id.
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Chile requires an energy matrix providing a good mix of domestic in-
puts-hydro, wind, geothermal, biomass, and solar sources-and im-
ported fuels, such as coal and LNG.36
Due to these energy constraints that Chile is facing, Senator Prokurica,
a member of a Chilean opposition party, , submitted to Congress a consti-
tutional reform that would allow private companies to explore, exploit,
and operate liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in Chile. This initiative seeks
to modify article 19, number 24 of Chile's Constitution that reserves the
exploration, exploitation, and operation of all hydrocarbons to the State
or its companies. Special operation agreements, however, which do not
affect the State's ownership and control, do not constitute concessions,
and do not bestow any rights over the hydrocarbon deposits, may be
awarded to private contractors. The proposed reform, which is supported
by various senators of the Senate's Commission on Mining and Energy,
will be presented to the Mining and Energy Secretary of State, for ob-
taining government support.37
D. NEW EXPLORATION AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENTS
Empresa Nacional del Petr6leo (ENAP), the Chilean state-owned oil
company and the Mining and Energy Secretary of State are promoting
hydrocarbons exploration in the extreme south of the country. ENAP is
carrying out exploration for natural gas in Lago Mercedes, Tierra del
Fuego. By the end of 2006, ENAP was scheduled to release a tender for
three blocks in the Magallanes Region basin to incorporate private enti-
ties in its hydrocarbons E&P in the extreme south of Chile. Ten compa-
nies, including Apache, British Gas, Chevron, Petrobras, and Marathon
Oil, have already expressed interest in the three blocks in the far south of
the country, dubbed Coir6n, Caupolicin, and Lenga. The three blocks
are among the eleven blocks in the basin that ENAP has defined along
geologic parameters. ENAP plans to explore the remaining eight blocks
on its own. ENAP began exploration and production on the Lago Merce-
des block in 2005, and Bermuda's energy firm Geopark holds a special
operating agreement awarded by the State for the Fell block in the Ma-
gallanes Region.38
ENAP has also been sponsoring a project to build a re-gasification ter-
minal in the port of Quinteros, located in Chile's central region, with a
capacity of 10mm3/day (expandable to 20m m3/day), and has announced
plans to award a contract for the import of LNG. 39 This LNG plant
would provide the supply needed to meet restrictions on the export of
Argentine gas.
36. Id.
37. DIARIO ESTRATEGIA, Nov. 30, 2006, available at http://www.estrategia.cl.
38. DIARIO FINANCIERO, Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.diariofinanciero.cl.
39. See Empresa Nacional del Petr6leo - Gas Natural Licuado, http://www.enap.cl/
opensite_20051005222716.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
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In September 2006, a consortium of Chilean companies participating in
this LNG project in Quintero-ENAP, Endesa Chile, and Metrogas, and
GNL Chile-signed a project development agreement with BG Group
that establishes the business structure of the project, identifies and regu-
lates the activities to be carried out, and defines the LNG supply terms
and the storage and re-gasification services. The agreement addresses the
basic terms of the gas sale contracts and the development of the engineer-
ing procurement construction (EPC), including the option for early sup-
ply in order to advance the start-up of the LNG complex. GNL Chile
announced that the preliminary activities being carried out in Quintero-
soundings, earth movement, topographical studies, oceanographic read-
ings, etc.-would be completed in the coming months, as well as negotia-
tions of the final commercial agreements. GNL Chile also announced
that it was negotiating with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) the prepa-
ration of the project's EPC turnkey contract containing a firm price and
the terms for the design, construction, assembly, and start-up of the com-
plete terminal, including the implementation of a fast-track option. Al-
though it was originally planned for the project to start gas deliveries in
2009, the pool of Chilean companies expects to commence the project in
a year. Fully operational, the project is expected to be able to meet ap-
proximately 40 percent of Chile's demand for natural gas, primarily in the
central region. Endesa, Metrogas, and ENAP-who will also supply Ena-
gas and GasValpo-have committed to firm demand for more than 6 mil-
lion cubic meters per day. The project also includes the construction of a
1,600 meter long mooring, unloading arms, two LNG storage tanks of
approximately 160,000 cubic meters each, a 10,000 cubic meter tank as
part of the fast-track option, and a vaporization station.40
In November 2006, French energy giant Suez signed a memorandum of
understanding with Chilean utility GasAtacama formalizing their alliance
for the study and development of a reception, storage, and re-gasification
terminal for LNG that they plan to build in Mejillones. The goal of the
LNG terminal will be to offer a secure natural gas supply to all the elec-
tricity generators and users in the north of Chile. Suez and GasAta-
cama's LNG terminal project includes a fast-track phase that will be
operational by the end of 2008 and will consist of an offloading dock and
an onshore re-gasification plant, which will inject natural gas into the
northern grid of the country and be used for industrial consumption.
During the fast-track phase, LNG will be offloaded as and when the re-
gasified natural gas is needed at the gas-fired power stations. The LNG
carrier will, therefore, act as a storage tank. The final design of the pro-
ject includes the construction of an onshore LNG storage tank, to which
an LNG carrier can transfer its entire load in less than twenty-four hours.
The storage tank could be operational by the end of 2010. Estimated
40. See Empresa Nacional del Petroleo (ENAP), LNG Project Companies Sign a Pro-
ject Development Agreement with BG, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.enap.cl/ingles/
opensite-det_20061002104848.asp.
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investment in the entire project amounts to between $300 million and




Upon instructions received from the government in August 2006,
Chile's state copper company Codelco announced that it will lead a con-
sortium of northern Chile's energy users to develop a LNG re-gasifica-
tion terminal project in the north of the country to supply the SING's
needs. The government aims to attract other unregulated clients in min-
eral-rich northern Chile to the consortium, particularly large mining com-
panies such as Minera Escondida and Minera Collahuasi, as well as the
northern electricity generators. Codelco will play the same role in the
consortium as state oil company ENAP in the LNG project being devel-
oped in Quintero. Technical and economic feasibility studies are being
developed for this project. 42
Methanex of Canada is working on a new project in Chile that involves
the construction of a new plant in Magallanes or another place in the
country that will not produce methanol but rather Demethyl Ether
(DME), a fuel similar to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The fuel could
supply Chile's central region because it is easily transportable. The plant
would produce 600 thousand tons annually and would imply an invest-
ment of between $40 million and $50 million. Methanex is currently in
search of partners for the initiative and has already held meetings with
ENAP and with Chilean and foreign private investors to promote natural
gas exploration in Magallanes. 43
VI. COLOMBIAN GAS MARKET
A. INTRODUCTION
Colombia's gas industry has four important actors: 1) the National
Agency of Hydrocarbons (Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos or ANH),
a governmental agency that manages the country's hydrocarbons
reserves; 2) a group of private companies, including Ecopetrol, Texaco,
BP, and Triton, 44 which currently carry out the vast majority of the explo-
ration and development of natural gas reserves; 3) the Energy and Gas
Regulatory Commission (CREG), a governmental agency which oversees
regulation in this downstream area; and 4) Ecogds, which, together with a
group of other private companies, 45 manages Colombia's transmission
41. See Helen Marshall, Suez and GasAtacama Sign Chile LNG Deal, ENERGY Busi-
NESS REVIEW, Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://www.energy-business-review.com/
article-news.asp?guid=3B19C13A-2788-4DFD-B5D8-C6C6D29CDDCF.
42. See Codelco to Lead Consortium for Northern Gas Plant, BUSINESS NEWS AMERI-
CAS, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.bnamericas.com; CNE supra note 22.
43. DIAmRo FINANCIERO, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.diariofinanciero.cl.
44. These companies carry out 95 percent of the gas production in Colombia.
45. The other companies responsible for gas transportation are (1) Promigas S.A., (2)
Transoriente S.A., (3) Transmetano, and (4) Progasur.
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system and operates gas transportation pipelines in the country. 46 The
CREG has segmented the industry into production, transmission, distri-
bution, and marketing sectors; and regulates the system via resolutions
covering matters such as production, transportation, distribution, market-
ing, and tariffs.
B. ECOGAS PRIVATIZATION
In 2002, the Consejo Nacional de Polftica Econ6mica y Social (Conpes),
pursuant to Conpes document number 3190/2002, recommended the
adoption of a stable price policy and the adoption of measures to pre-
serve the financial viability of Ecogis. Conpes followed-up this report
with a new report one year later 47 that analyzed the need to consolidate
the natural gas industry in Colombia. Conpes' recommendation was to
privatize Ecogds. Ecogdis operates approximately 3,644 kilometers of nat-
ural gas trunk pipelines in Colombia.48 In 2004, measured by gross reve-
nue, Ecogis was the second largest state-owned company (after
Ecopetrol). These financial results reflect the 2002 reforms, which
granted greater autonomy to the company to be managed with a more
market oriented approach. Pursuant to Decree 1404, the government is-
sued the rules to govern the Ecogis privatization process. In December
2006, the Empresa de Energia de BogotA (EEB) purchased Empresa
Colombiana de Gas (ECOGAS) for approximately U.S. $1.44 billion, ex-
ceeding the expectations of the government.
C. ACQUISITION OF 42.97 PERCENT OF THE SHARES
OF PROMIGAS, S.A. E.S.P.
The main activity of Promigas S.A. E.S.P. is the transportation of natu-
ral gas, transporting approximately 50 percent of the natural gas in Co-
lombia. Promigas also has investments in gas distribution. With Terpel,
Promigas has operations in the vehicular gas sectors of Ecuador, Peru,
and Mexico. In December 2006, Ashmore Investments, an English in-
vestment fund, through its subsidiary Prisma Energy, purchased approxi-
mately a one-third interest of Promigas from EMHC, a former Enron
subsidiary. Then, in December 2006, Prisma Energy acquired an approx
10 percent of Promigas from Corporaci6n Financiera de Colombia
(Corficolombia), an entity controlled by Organizaci6n Sarmiento Angulo.
46. Ecogas and Promigas S.A. manage 95 percent of Colombia's gas transmission sys-
tem. Ecogas operates gas transportation pipelines in central and southern Colom-
bia and Promigas S.A. does so in the north of the country.
47. CONSE.Io NACIONAL DE POLITICA ECONOMICA'Y SOCIAL, ESTRATEGIAS PARA LA
DINAMIZACION Y CONSOLIDACION DEL SECTOR DE GAS NATURAL EN COLOMBIA,
CONPES DOCUMENT No. 3244/2003 (15 Septiembre de 2003).
48. Ecoggs' total gas transportation network represents approximately 70 percent of
Colombia's transportation pipeline systems
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VII. PARAGUAY
A. INTRODUCTION TO PARAGUAYAN ENERGY SECTOR
The Paraguayan energy sector is made up almost exclusively of renew-
able energy sources with approximately 68.6 percent of the gross internal
supply coming from hydroelectricity, 30.9 percent coming from biomass
(firewood, vegetable residues, and other biomasses), and 0.5 percent
coming from oil and mineral carbons. 49 Paraguay is one of the largest
hydroelectric producers in the world, and, given the small internal de-
mand, it is able to export a relatively large amount. But approximately 98
percent of Paraguay's electricity exports are sold to Brazil and Argentina
under the terms and conditions agreed to under the Itaipti and YacyretA
treaties, respectively, at prices significantly below international market
levels.
The Vice Ministry of Mines and Energy, a branch of the Ministry of
Public Works and Communications (MOPC), is the regulatory authority
for the national energy sector. The Paraguayan government plays a key
role in the energy sector, both as regulator and as a commercial actor.
The state-owned companies acting in the energy sector are the national
power company (Administraci6n Nacional de Electricidad or ANDE),
which holds a legal monopoly in the power sector, and Petr6leos
Paraguayos (PETROPAR), which holds the authority to industrialize oil
and the legal monopoly in the importation of crude oil and diesel oil. As
Paraguay does not yet produce oil or gas, the government is providing
incentives for national and international investment in hydrocarbon ex-
ploration and exploitation activities.
B. PARAGUAYAN OIL AND GAS MARKET
The Paraguayan Constitution of 1992 provides that all hydrocarbons
and solid, liquid, and gas minerals in their natural state found in the coun-
try are owned by the State. The government, however, may grant conces-
sions for prospecting, exploration, and exploitation activities, for a
limited time, to public, private, or mixed companies, whether national or
foreign owned. 50 The MOPC is the public entity in charge of administer-
ing the State's hydrocarbon resources.
Prospecting permits are granted for areas of up to 2,400,000 hectares
for a term of one year, which may be renewed for up to one additional
term. Exploration and exploitation concessions are granted by means of
a contract signed with the Paraguayan State. The contract is first negoti-
ated with the MOPC, upon whose recommendation it is approved by de-
cree of the executive branch, and finally must be passed as law by
49. Percentages were calculated based on the Energy Balance of the Republic of Para-
guay, whose preliminary version was published in 2005 by the Vice-Ministry of
Mines and Energy. See Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones, http://
www.ssme.gov.py/VMME/Copia%20de%20VMME-pese.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2007).
50. CONSTITUTICION DE LA REPOBLICA DEL PARAGUAY art. 112.
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Congress in order to enter into force. Exploration concessions are
granted for a term of four years, renewable for a term of two additional
years in batches of 40,000 hectares in a maximum area of 800,000 hect-
ares. Finally, when the concessionaire enters the exploitation phase, the
extension and location of the chosen areas must be communicated to the
MOPC. Exploitation concessions are granted for a term of twenty years,
renewable for a term of ten additional years. Exploitation is limited to an
area not less than twenty hectares nor greater than five thousand
hectares.
The current Hydrocarbons Law (Law Number 779/95) had a special tax
regime with fiscal exemptions for prospecting and exploration activities
and a special tax regime for exploitation activities made up of an initial
and an annual exploitation tax, according to the amount of hectares
under exploitation and depending on the number of years of the activity.
But this special regime was repealed by Law Number 2421/04 titled the
Administrative Reordering and Fiscal Adjustment Law. The executive
branch has submitted to Congress a draft of a law that would reinstate the
aforementioned tax regime and clarify its scope. The law has been ap-
proved by the House of Representatives and is pending approval in the
Senate.
The recent oil and gas discoveries and activities in neighboring coun-
tries (e.g. Bolivia) create interest in the oil and natural gas potential of
Paraguay. The Paraguayan territory is made up of an extensive region of
sedimentary basins (94.8 percent) with a favorable hydrocarbon poten-
tial, which is not yet productive, due in part to the government's historic
focus on hydroelectric power and the lack of continuity in exploration
activities. 51 The government has expressed its goal of encouraging na-
tional and international investment in this sector.
Paraguay has recently signed an agreement with the Venezuelan gov-
ernment, whereby PDVSA will provide technical assistance in analyzing
existing information regarding the possible existence of hydrocarbons in
Paraguay.52
PETROPAR has exclusivity in the importation of crude oil and diesel
oil, but all other petroleum derivatives are freely imported with no other
restrictions other than those imposed by legal norms based on technical
standards. PETROPAR owns one refinery that produces part of the pe-
troleum derivates needed to meet the internal demand of the country,
and the rest is imported by various multinationals that operate in the
market. PETROPAR does not participate directly in the marketing of
fuels derived from petroleum to the end consumer. Naphtha prices have
been deregulated since 1994.
51. Fernando Wiens, Sfntesis del Potencial de Hidrocarburos del Paraguay (2002),
available at http://www.ssme.gov.pyVMME/Copia%20de%20VMME-pese.htm.
52. See Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones, Mision Technica Recibio In-
formacion Tecnica, Oct. 10, 2006, http://www.mopc.gov.py/www2004/pdvsa_101
006.htm.
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The construction of various regional gas pipelines is being negotiated,
and one of the main objectives of the MOPC for the 2003-2008 term is to
conclude the feasibility study for the transportation of gas from the De-
partment of Tarija in Bolivia to Mariscal Estigarribia in the western re-
gion of the country known as the Chaco Paraguayo, with connections
through the Paraguayan River. Alternative sources of energy such as al-
cohol and biodiesel production are also being explored and encouraged
by the government.
VIII. PERUVIAN GAS MARKET
A. INTRODUCTION
The 1993 Peruvian Constitution provides that all natural resources,
such as hydrocarbons, are owned by the State. But oil and gas explora-
tion and exploitation activities are carried out by private entities, which
must enter into license or service agreements with Perupetro,53 the state-
owned oil and gas company that holds the mineral reserves. Under the
license agreement model, the government, acting via Perupetro, transfers
the right to extract hydrocarbons in exchange for royalties. By contrast,
under the service agreement model, Perupetro pays a service fee that is
not contingent on the success of the activities. Exploration agreements
have a seven-year term (under exceptional circumstances, the term may
be extended up to three additional years), and exploitation agreements
have a thirty-year term for oil and a forty-year term for natural gas.
Holders of licenses have the ability to use the hydrocarbons as they see
fit, and the licenses may export the oil and gas free of taxes. License
holders have access to expedited importation proceedings for the import
of goods and raw materials to carry out their activities in Peru.
In 2003, Peru adopted Law 28109 designed to promote exploration and
production activities for marginal oil and gas reserves. Under this law,
royalties due under license agreements were reduced and payments to
contractors under service agreements were increased.
Two governmental authorities regulate the oil and gas industry in Peru.
The Ministry of Energy and Mining adopts high-level regulations, 54 while
OSINERG 55 is responsible for the more operational and technical as-
pects of the sector.
B. CAMISEA GAS PROJECT
The most important project of the Peruvian oil and gas industry is un-
doubtedly the Camisea gas project (Block 88). This designated area
holds one of the largest gas reserves in South America. The proven vol-
53. See Perupetro S.A., http://www.perupetro.com.pe (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
54. See Ministerio de Energia y Minas, http://www.minem.gob.pe (last visited Mar. 10,
2007).
55. See Organismo Supervisor de la Inversion en Energia y Mineria, http://www.
osinerg.gob.pe (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
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ume of gas for these fields "in situ" is 8.7 trillions of cubic feet (TCF), and
these fields represent an estimated recovery of 6.8 TCF of natural gas and
411 million barrels of associated natural gas liquids.5 6 For this project,
Peru awarded the following through public bids: 1) the license agree-
ment57 for the production of Block 88; 2) the concession for the transpor-
tation of gas and natural gas liquids;58 and 3) the concession for the
distribution of the gas for the urban areas of Lima and Callao.59 In Au-
gust 2004, the production of the Camisea gas fields began, as well as the
operation of the transportation and distribution systems.
In response to the Camiesa Project, Peru has adopted numerous laws
and regulations to develop the natural gas industry. For example, Law
27133 set several conditions for fostering investment in production and
development of a gas transportation and distribution pipelines, as well as
for the creation of a gas market.
Among the measures issued for fostering the natural gas industry, the
Peruvian government has granted the operators of the transportation and
distribution system a guarantee for securing the operators' annual income
that adequately compensates the costs of the operation of the pipelines
considering a minimum required transportation and distribution capacity.
The funding for this guarantee, known as the Main Grid Guarantee, is
obtained from electricity generators, who in turn pass on this cost to the
electricity end-users.
In addition, in order to secure the supply of natural gas to the gas mar-
ket to be created, the producers of the Camisea gas fields (Block 88) have
the obligation of supplying gas to the local market. Their ability to export
gas is subject to the requirement of guaranteeing the provision of gas for
the local market for a twenty-year period, based on the demand forecasts
and the level of reserves of the country.
Notwithstanding the above, given that the local market for gas is not
large enough for the anticipated production of the Camisea gas fields, the
project also contemplates the exportation of LNG. In fact, Peru LNG, a
company formed by some of the members participating in the upstream
stream (lead by Hunt Oil), have a project for building a LNG plant with
the intention of exporting LNG to possibly Mexico and/or the United
States.
With respect to LNG plants, the Peruvian government has adopted a
law designed to provide certain incentives for the building, operation, and
maintenance of natural gas processing plants, which include LNG plants
as well as rules. The benefits available for natural gas processing plants
56. See Proyecto Camisea, http://www.camisea.com.pe (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
57. The license agreement was originally awarded to a consortium lead by Pluspetrol
(operator), Hunt Oil, SK Group, Sonatrach, and Techint.
58. The concession for the transportation of gas and natural gas liquids was awarded
to Transportadora de Gas del Peru (Pluspetrol, Hunt Oil, Techint, Sonatrach, SK
Corporation, Grafia & Montero, and Tractebel).
59. The concession for the distribution of gas in Lima and Callao was awarded to
Tractebel.
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include, among other things, the stability of the income tax regime and
tax free exportation of the production of the processing plant. These ben-
efits may be obtained through the execution of specific agreements with
the Peruvian government.
In connection with this LNG project, in 2004 the consortium of the
Camisea Project was awarded a second license agreement for the explo-
ration and production of Block 56. This license does not contain restric-
tions on the exportation of the gas that could be produced.
IX. CONCLUSION
The 2006 year highlighted the continued return of petro-nationalism
60
to Latin America. Among other countries, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nic-
aragua elected or re-elected left-of-center populist governments, and
other candidates with similar views ran strong presidential campaigns in
Peru and Mexico. These figures are calling for an enhanced role of the
State and national oil companies in an effort to recoup additional reve-
nues and address national anxiety for the failure to keep pace with coun-
tries in other parts of the world (notably Asia and Eastern Europe) who
have enjoyed more robust economic growth. Although these nationalis-
tic trends are visible in other parts of the world, they have become partic-
ularly visible in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina.6 ' Often
times, the victims are enhanced regional collaboration and integration,
the rule of law (as evidenced by recent state disputes between Brazil and
Bolivia, Argentina and Chile, and Bolivia and Chile), and oil and gas pro-
duction and efficiency. At the same time, Venezuela is using its enhanced
purchasing power to develop its own regional energy initiative entitled
PetroAmerica,6 2 which contemplates ambitious projects (frequently with
other national oil companies) such as the construction of a gas pipeline to
Argentina, a refinery in northeast Brazil with Petrobras, and a refinery in
Cienfuegos, Cuba 63 with Cupet. Whether these projects, among others,
are commercially viable or more politically-motivated efforts, the trend
highlights some of the challenges to economic growth in the region and
60. See Rodolfo Guzman et al., A Resurgence of Petro-Nationalism, in THE WORLD
ENERGY BOOK: ISSUE II 19 (The Petroleum Economist Ltd. ed., 2006).
61. President Nestor Kirchner announced that he would not run for re-election for the
presidency and rather would support his wife Cristina Kirchner, an influential sen-
ator, for the highest office. See Campaigning for Cristina, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2007.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Per an October 2000 accord between Venezuela and Cuba, Venezuela also sells
Cuba up to 100,000 barrels of oil per day at a discount of up to 40 percent, with
U.S. $5 billion of oil having been delivered to Cuba since 2003. PDVSA is also
building a U.S. $20 million electricity grid in a rural part of the island. Cuba now
produces 80,000 barrels per day of oil, although the country consumes more than
twice as much of what it produces, with the difference being made up by Vene-
zuela. Cuba has signed exploration agreements with Oil & Natural Gas Corp. (In-
dia), Petroliam Nasional Bhd. (Malaysia), Repsol (Spain), and Sherritt
International (Canada). See Guillermo Parra-Bernal, Comrades in Oil, BLOOM-
BERG MARKETS, Dec. 2006.
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the regional tendency to swing from one ideological extreme to another, a
trend identified by Andres Oppenheimer in his book Cuentos Chinos.
Nevertheless, as Brazil and its national oil company Petrobras demon-
strate, it is possible to have a strong national oil company using leading
technology (e.g. deep offshore exploration), while still enjoying the bene-
fits of foreign investment and competition. Moreover, Mexico may soon
have to reevaluate its historic policy and the role of its national oil com-
pany as Pemex struggles with declining investment and production. Per-
haps what the region needs is a serious social democratic movement in
the respective countries in the region (akin to Chile and Brazil) which can
participate in peaceful transitions of power and govern in a manner that
meets the needs of its constituents and still attracts needed foreign invest-
ment. Such a development could be pivotal in transforming the region
from one that exports natural resources to one that exports intellectual
capital.
